With the removal of statute-based anti-takeover provisions during the aftermath of Asian crisis, a significant number of Korean firms started to introduce charter-based measures. In this paper, we make use of this unique situation where firm-level anti-takeover provisions (ATP) vary over time (making firm fixed effects regression feasible) and its amendment requires a shareholder approval (making event study feasible), when investigating the link between ATP and firm performance. Using a sample during 1999-2009, we find that firms with charter-based anti-takeover provisions are smaller in size, have lower inside and foreign ownerships, and upon adoption, experience lower share prices, the extent of which drops with inside ownership. Consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis in Jensen (1986), we also find that these firms increase capital expenditure. Our finding also shows that ATP adoptions are followed by lower profitability and lower dividend payouts. Firms with ATPs also experience greater de-listings after the global financial crisis.
Introduction
When investigating the relationship between anti-takeover provisions (ATP) and firm performance, most of the empirical work in the existing literature studies U.S. firms (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003 , Bebchuk, Masulis, Wang, and Xie 2007 , and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009 3 Also, given the timeinvariant nature of U.S. anti-takeover measures, firm fixed effects regressions, which control for unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics, are usually not feasible. For this reason, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) reject the use of firm fixed effects regressions. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) try industry fixed effects in their robustness check, but make no attempts to try firm fixed effects. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) do run firm fixed effects regressions, but finds evidence of entrenchment effect only for a subset of anti-takeover provisions.
Moreover, most of the anti-takeover provisions are not charter-based, which means that boards can adopt them without shareholders' approval. This makes most of the anti-takeover provisions subject to the shadow pill problem à la Coates (2000) and makes event studies meaningless. That is, given the ease to adopt anti-takeover provisions via board decision, market participants view as if such provisions are already in place and share prices reflect the entrenchment effect even before their adoptions. Last but not least, the adoption of anti-takeover measures is an endogenous choice variable. A manager foreseeing the fall in share price, and therefore concerned with the heightened possibility of hostile takeover, may choose to introduce anti-takeover measures. In this case, the causality is running from firm value to the adoption of anti-takeover measures, not the other way around.
In this paper, we attempt to overcome these four shortcomings or challenges by making use of a unique situation in Korea. Before the Asian crisis, no Korean firm adopted charter-based ATPs, such as supermajority requirement on director dismissals, golden parachutes, supermajority requirement on mergers, and so on. Although, their adoption was not illegal, firms did not adopt any as they were already protected by statute-based anti-takeover provisions. The removal of statute-based anti-takeover provisions during the aftermath of the Asian crisis, however, created a totally new environment. Individual firms were forced to make decisions whether or not to adopt ATPs. This abrupt shift in environment, in our view, constitutes an experimental setting. 3 There are a limited number of exceptions, which include Lange, Ramsay, and Woo (2000) that studies Australian anti-takeover devices and Arikawa and Mitsusada (2008) and Kato, Fabre, and Westerholm (2009) that studies poison pills in Japan. 4 To constitute a natural experiment, (i) we need to have an exogenous shock and (2) this shock must be treated to a subset so that we have a control group, against which we evaluate the treatment effect. The setting we investigate in our paper, however, lacks the second requirement, which is why we do not use the term natural experiment, but prefer to use the term quasi-experiment.
During the post-crisis period, a significant number of Korean firms started to introduce charterbased ATPs. This created a setting, where one can have within-firm variation in ATPs and which allows one to investigate the relationship between ATPs and firm performance in a firm fixed effects framework.
Also, given that all the provisions newly introduced are charter-based that require shareholders' approval, we are not subject to the shadow pill problem that often plagues U.S. studies. Moreover, their adoption at the shareholders' meeting is an unexpected news item that constitutes a valid event, allowing one to conduct meaningful event studies. Firm fixed effects regressions and event studies greatly alleviate the endogeneity problem since it investigates whether firm value drops when it should. In other words, we have identification in time.
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Besides providing evidence outside of U.S. and using firm fixed effects regressions and event studies, this paper makes another contribution to the literature by investigating anti-takeover measures in a country setting where firms typically have concentrated ownership structure. Specifically, we investigate how the level of inside ownership -control rights, to be exact -is associated with the choice of anti-takeover provisions. Also, we study how the link between anti-takeover provisions and firm performance is influenced by the level of inside ownership.
Using public firms in Korea, over 1999-2009, we first investigate the factors behind the adoption of anti-takeover provisions. We find that firms with charter-based anti-takeover provisions have lower inside ownership, lower foreign ownership, and smaller firm size. We then ask our main question whether antitakeover charter amendments are associated with lower firm value, and if so, why? Using the same sample of firms, we find that firms with anti-takeover provisions experience lower share prices. This is so in our event studies and also in our firm fixed effects regressions. We also find that the extent of such share price drop is greater for firms with low inside ownership, suggesting that the level of inside ownership and charter-based anti-takeover measures are substitutes.
We next test three hypotheses that identify the channels through which the adoption of antitakeover measures lead to lower firm value. The channels we investigate include investment (capital expenditure), profitability, and dividend payouts. Consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis in Jensen (1986), we find that firms with anti-takeover measures experience higher capital expenditures, lower profitability, and lower dividend payouts. Lastly, we test how firms with anti-takeover provisions fared during the global financial crisis by investigating the firms that were delisted either in 2009 or 2010. We find that firms with anti-takeover provisions resulted in a greater number of de-listings than the ones without such provisions.
Testing the entrenchment effect of anti-takeover charter amendments can also shed light on the current policy debate in Korea over the adoption of poison pill. The present Commercial Code in Korea does not allow firms to issue poison pills. The government, however, proposed a Commercial Code revision bill in 2010 that allows it. Even though we do not directly study poison pills in this paper, we can make inference about their consequences. This is because the anti-takeover measures we study are weaker defense tools, and if we find evidence of managerial entrenchment from them, we can safely infer the existence of entrenchment effect from a stronger defense tool, such as poison pill.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the anti-takeover devices in Korea, with a focus on charter-based anti-takeover provisions, which is the main subject of this paper. We also briefly discuss the recent debate in Korea whether to introduce poison pill. Section 3 outlines our hypotheses and section 4 explains the data and the sample. Section 5 provides the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
Anti-Takeover Measures in Korea
A. Statute-Based Anti-Takeover Provisions before the Crisis Before the financial crisis in 1997, Korean corporate managers were fully entrenched. Until Dec. 1996, they were protected by the 10 percent rule in the Securities and Exchange Act. Under this rule, no shareholder, besides the controlling shareholder at the time of IPO, can own more than 10 percent of voting shares in public companies. This rule, which existed since 1976, was necessary in earlier years to induce Korean firms to publicly float their shares on the stock exchange and thereby enlarge the size of the Korean capital market.
In January 1997, this rule was replaced by three others. 6 One was a mandatory bid rule in the Securities and Exchange Act, where any shareholder acquiring more than 25 percent of voting shares, must acquire additional shares to own more than 50 percent of the total voting rights. Given the chronic scarcity of capital in those years and the difficulty to externally finance acquisition deals, this rule was also regarded as a statute-based anti-takeover device. The other two rules were against foreign acquisitions. Foreign Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act introduced a rule where any foreigner wishing to acquire more than 10 percent of pre-existing shares must obtain board approval. It also introduced a rule where any foreigner wishing to acquire shares of a large firm (book asset value above 2 trillion won) must obtain approval from the Minister of Finance and Economy. By law, the Minister was obliged to approve the acquisition if aggregate foreign ownership was less than 15 percent of total outstanding shares and no foreigner can become the largest shareholder.
These three rules, however, lasted only a year. As part of an effort to induce foreign capital inflow during the aftermath of the financial crisis, Korean government repealed all three rules in February 1998.
The limit on foreign aggregate ownership, which increased gradually from 10 percent in Jan. Biosmart (a magnetic stripe card manufacturer) has a supermajority requirement for mergers. If a merger is determined by board decision as hostile, a merger requires 90 percent or higher approval by participating shares and 70 percent of higher approval by outstanding shares. Again, this requirement is substantially higher than the one prescribed in the Commercial Code. 10 Another example is Curoholdings (a semiconductor testing device manufacturer), which is subject to a supermajority requirement on control-related charter amendments. In its charter, it first has a provision regarding supermajority requirement on director dismissals. It then has another provision that requires a supermajority approval to amend the first provision. Synopexgreentech (a machinery equipment manufacturer), on the other hand, has a golden parachute (5 billion won) provision in its charter and also a provision that delays the effective date if one amends the golden parachute provision.
C. Debate over Poison Pill
8 See SER (2009). 9 To dismiss a director, the Commercial Code requires approval by at least two thirds of participating shares and one third of outstanding shares. 10 According to the Commercial Code, a merger requires approval by at least two thirds of participating shares and one third of outstanding shares.
As mentioned earlier, in 2010, the Korean government submitted to the National Assembly a Commercial
Code revision bill that allows poison pill. The proposed pill, however, has a number of unique features that differentiates it from the ones popularly adopted in the U.S. First, it is a charter-based anti-takeover measure. That is, the board's decision to issue poison pill must be based on a provision in the corporate charter. Second, when issuing poison pill, board must obtain approval from at least two thirds of board members.
Despite such features, critics argue that the pill is more likely to be misused and eventually harm corporate performance, especially in a country setting like the one in Korea, where independent board members are rare, outside monitoring by institutional investors is weak, and level of control-related private benefits are high. 11 They also criticize government's justification for allowing the pill. One of government's arguments is that, in the absence of statute-based anti-takeover measures, firms excessively engage in stock repurchases, which divert corporate resources away from productive activities. For the government's argument to be justified, firms should experience higher firm value and increased capital expenditure during the post-pill period. The critics, however, predict otherwise. That is, managers will effectively entrench themselves and engage in value-decreasing investments, which will lower firm value.
We believe the empirical results of our study can shed light on this debate. Even though we do not directly study poison pill, we can make inference about its consequences by examining the anti-takeover measures of our study. This is justified because, compared to poison pill, the measures we study in this paper are weaker anti-takeover tools. If we find evidence of managerial entrenchment from a weaker ATP, we can safely infer that there would be an entrenchment effect from a stronger ATP.
Hypotheses
A. Which Firms Choose to Adopt Anti-Takeover Measures?
We first investigate the factors that motivate corporate insiders to adopt anti-takeover charter provisions.
Here, we consider two factors: inside ownership and firm size. First, we hypothesize that firms with lower inside control are more likely to adopt charter-based anti-takeover measures. This is self-explanatory.
Firms with concentrated ownership are insulated from hostile takeover threats, and therefore should not have much incentive to adopt anti-takeover measures.
11 For detailed criticism against the proposal, see Kim (2010 
Data
The data on anti-takeover provisions is from the Economic Reform Research Institute (ERRI), a private think tank specialized in economic reform issues in Korea. ERRI collected the data by going through the corporate charter of each and every listed firm on the Korea Exchange over a nine year period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ).
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The dark grey bars in the first bar chart in Figure 1 shows the cumulative number of nonfinancial and supermajority requirement on control-related charter amendments (119 firms).
Our default measure of entrenchment in this paper is a dummy variable named ATP, which takes a value of 1 if anti-takeover provision (ATP) exists, and 0 otherwise. Since we measure ATP each year, ATP is a time-varying dummy. In our robustness tests, we experiment with other entrenchment measures. 14 There are pros and cons of using ATP dummy over ATP Index. One merit is that we do not have to worry about how to assign weights on each provision when constructing an index. Similarly, we do not have to make an arbitrary assumption that each provision has equal value. There is a problem though. We are assuming that firms do not get more entrenched by adding more anti-takeover provisions. Firms with one ATP are assumed to be equally entrenched as firms with all six ATPs. But, using ATP Index that simply counts the number of ATPs is not a solution. This is because it ignores that ATPs are to some extent substitutes and that simply adding ATPs do not necessarily increase the level of entrenchment proportionately.
Results

A. Which Firms Choose to Adopt Anti-Takeover Measures?
To investigate the factors behind the charter-based anti-takeover amendments, we run Probit regression for ATP (1 if anti-takeover provision exists, 0 otherwise). Table 3 shows the results. Column (1) includes 2-digit industry dummies, while column (2) includes 4-digit industry dummies. 15 Both regressions include year dummies. Point estimates denote marginal effects on probability. Standard errors are clustered by firm. As expected, the coefficient on inside ownership is negative and highly significant, indicating that firms with concentrated inside ownership are less likely to adopt charter-based antitakeover measures. Alternatively, one can interpret that they are substitutes when it comes to antitakeover defense measures. The coefficient of -0.0004 (in column (2)) suggests that a 25%p increase in inside ownership drops the probability of ATP adoption by 1%p. Given that pooled sample mean of ATP is only 5%, this can be considered as a substantial drop in probability. Table 3 also shows that foreign ownership lowers the likelihood of ATP adoption. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant.
But, the economic magnitude is relatively small. The coefficient of -0.0002 (in column (2)) suggests that a 25%p increase in foreign ownership drops the probability of ATP adoption by 0.5%p. One can interpret that the monitoring role of foreign investors discourages corporate managers from introducing antitakeover provisions.
The result in Table 3 also shows that smaller firms are more likely to introduce anti-takeover charter amendments. The coefficient on firm size is negative and highly significant. This is consistent with our earlier conjecture that large firm size serves as an effective takeover defense, since it takes more resources to acquire a larger target. According to this view, larger firms would have less incentive to adopt ATPs, thus resulting in a negative relationship between firm size and ATP. Our result is also consistent with the conjecture that large firms refrain from adopting anti-takeover charter amendments for fear of media and analyst attentions. The coefficient of -0.003 (in column (2) We next investigate if firms with anti-takeover charter amendments exhibit lower firm value during the post-amendment period. In doing so, we take two approaches: event studies and firm fixed effects regressions.
Event Study Results
Figure 2 shows our event study results, where the day of shareholders' meeting is used as an event day.
We estimate abnormal returns from market model (KOSDAQ Composite Index for KOSDAQ firms and KOSPI for all other listed firms) using past 250 trading days from day -260 to -11 as the estimation period.
The figures plot cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) from day -10 through day +20. 16 The first figure (A), which uses the full sample of firms, suggests the existence of negative announcement effect. Firms with anti-takeover provisions experience a share price fall of 3% over a 30-day period. Table   4 shows whether this announcement effect is statistically significant. When average abnormal returns (AAR) are cumulated from day -10 (columns (1) and (2)), t-stats are low and CAARs are marginally significant only in day +18. This is partly because the CAAR value at day 0 is above zero (0.6%). When we cumulate average abnormal returns (AAR) from day 0 (columns (3) and (4)), the statistical significance improves substantially. CAAR is significantly different from zero from day +2 and in most of the days during the event period.
We also test if the negative announcement effect strengthens in firms with low inside ownership. If market views the level of inside ownership as a substitute to charter-based anti-takeover measures, the magnitude of announcement effect would be greater in firms with low inside ownership. The second figure (B) shows the test results. We conduct the same event study using a sample restricted to those with inside ownership less than 10 percent. The magnitude of share price fall is around 9%, which is substantially greater than the one we have seen using the full sample. This is so even if we take into account the share price fall that took place before the event day (3.5%). Statistical significance, however, is rather weak. When average abnormal returns (AAR) are cumulated from day -10 (Table 4 , columns (5) and (6)), CAARs are marginally significant in nine days out of a 30-day event period. If we cumulate average abnormal returns (AAR) from day 0 (columns (7) and (8)), CAARs are marginally significant in five days out of a 30-day event period.
Next, we test if the negative announcement effect strengthens with firm size. If media and analyst coverage facilitate new information to be incorporated in share prices, the magnitude of announcement effect would be greater at the time of adoption in firms with large capitalization stocks. To test this, we restrict to firms with market capitalization greater than 50 billion won (approximately 50 million dollar).
The third figure (C) shows the result. The magnitude of share price fall is around 5%, which is again substantially greater than the one when using the full sample. Table 4 shows the statistical significance of CAAR. When average abnormal returns (AAR) are cumulated from day -10 (columns (9) and (10)),
CAARs are insignificant throughout event period. This is probably because the CAAR value at day 0 is above zero (1.3%). When we cumulate average abnormal returns (AAR) from day 0 (columns (11) and (12)), the statistical significance improves substantially. CAAR is significantly different from zero from day +2 and in most of the days during the event period.
Lastly, we conduct event studies using firms that adopt ATPs, but do not experience a fall in NI/Assets during the immediate past fiscal year. 17 This is because, in Korea, newly audited earning figures are released immediately before the shareholders' meeting (by regulation, no later than a week before) and such announcements may affect share prices. The fourth figure (D) shows the result for ATP adopters with inside ownership less than 10% that did not experience drop in NI/Assets. The fifth figure (E) shows the result for ATP adopters with market capitalization above 50 billion Korean won that did not experience drop in NI/Assets. One can easily observe that the negative share price reactions are much sharper in these subsamples. In other words, our finding strengthens as we drop the events that are contaminated by new earning announcements.
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In unreported analyses, we test if share price reacts at the time of meeting notification, which is typically two weeks (or 10 business days) before the day of shareholders' meeting. 19 If shareholders react at the time of notification, their reaction on the day of shareholders' meeting may underestimate the true wealth effect of entrenchment. The CAR figures, where the notification day is used as day 0, show that nothing much happens at the time of notification. One possibility is the uncertainty of ATP's adoption.
Before the shareholders' meeting market participants do not know for sure whether the ATPs would be adopted.
Firm Value
17 Note that we do not use earnings surprises here. This is because equity analysts in Korea usually do not publish earnings forecasts for small firms, which take up a significant fraction of our ATP adopters. 18 In unreported figures, we show the results for ATP adopters that did experience a fall in NI/Assets during the immediate past fiscal year. We verify that share prices respond negatively even before day 0. This is consistent with share price responding to negative earnings announcement, which may dilute the effect of ATP adoption. 19 According to the Korean Commercial Code (article 363), the minimum notice period is 14 days, which approximately 10 business days. According to Kim (2010) Table 5 shows the results. When using the full sample (column (1)), we do not find any association between ATP and firm value. The coefficient on ATP is insignificant. So, in columns (2) - (5) As robustness check, we experimented with industry-adjusted Tobin's q following Bebchuk (2009).
In unreported tables, we show that our results remain intact. The coefficient magnitude drops 20 In the tables reported in this paper, we do not lag our ATP dummy variable. There are two reasons behind this. First, ATPs are adopted at the shareholders' meetings, which are usually held in March. For firms with fiscal year ending in December, which take up most of our sample firms, ATP in the same year is already lagged by ninemonth. Second, in case of firm value, there is no reason to believe that it would react with a time lag to the adoption of ATP. Nonetheless, we conducted a robustness check where we lagged our ATP dummy variable. Although statistical significance weakened, most of our key results remained intact. 21 As a robustness test, we tried free cash flows over assets in lieu of operating profits (EBIT) over assets. Our key results remain intact. 22 Given the median Tobin's q value of 0.95 and the median debt/asset ratio of 0.46, the median (market value of equity/asset) ratio is 0.49 (= 0.95 -0.46). Also, after a 26.6 percent drop in Tobin's q, the new Tobin's q is 0.7 and the new (market value of equity/asset) ratio is 0.24 (= 0.7 -0.46). Provided that the size of asset remains constant, a drop of (market value of equity/assets) from 0.49 to 0.24 is a 51 percent drop in market value of equity.
monotonically with the level of inside ownership and the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant.
We also experimented with other entrenchment measures: ATP Index (equals the number of antitakeover provisions) and ATP N (takes a value of 1 if at least N number of anti-takeover provisions exits, and 0 otherwise). Our key results in Table 5 remain intact when using ATP Index, ATP 2, and ATP 3.
These measures are negatively associated with firm's market value for firms with inside ownership less than 10%, and the coefficients are significant either at 1 or 5 percent level. We, however, do not get similar results when using ATP 4, ATP 5, or ATP 6. This is most likely because there is very little time variation in these variables. Summary statistics in Table 2 Panel B shows that the standard deviations are respectively 0.06, 0.01, and 0.00.
Capital Expenditures
Next, we test the overinvestment hypothesis of Jensen (1986). Investment is measured by capital expenditures scaled by previous fiscal year-end total assets. To fix its skewed distribution, we use its logarithm. In our regressions, we control for growth opportunity, which is measured by Tobin's q. Since we also control for operating profit, Tobin's q in our regression captures growth opportunity rather than firm performance. Regressions are estimated over the 1999-2009 period using nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange. t-values are based on standard errors clustered by firm. Table 6 shows the results. When using the full sample, however, we do not find any association between ATP and capital expenditure (column (1)). As in the case of firm value regressions in Table 5, we run sub-sample regressions, where the sub-samples are grouped by the level of inside ownership (columns (2)- (5)). We find that within-firm adoption of anti-takeover provision leads to a within-firm increase in capital expenditure in firms with lower inside ownership. When restricting the sample to those with inside ownership less than 10 percent, the coefficient on ATP is 0.7994. As for these firms, an adoption of ATP increases ln(CAPEX/Assets) by 0.8 or CAPEX/Assets by 80 percent. This is a substantial jump in investment. This result alone does not constitute evidence that firms with ATP engage in overinvestment. But, if one puts together this with the evidence in Table 5 , one can conclude that most of the capital expenditures were value decreasing, consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis of Jensen (1986). In the absence of hostile takeover threats (adoption of anti-takeover measures in firms with inside ownership less than 10 percent), managers tend to invest in value-destroying projects (increase in capital expenditure) and this lowers firm value.
Column (6) We also experimented with other entrenchment measures: ATP Index (equals the number of antitakeover provisions) and ATP N (takes a value of 1 if at least N number of anti-takeover provisions exits, and 0 otherwise). Our key results in Table 6 remain intact when using ATP Index, ATP 2, and ATP 3.
These measures are positively associated with capital expenditure for firms with inside ownership less than 10%, and the coefficients are significant either at 1 or 5 percent level. We, however, do not get similar results when using ATP 4, ATP 5, or ATP 6. As discussed previously, this is most likely because there is very little time variation in these variables. Summary statistics in Table 2 Panel B shows that the standard deviations are respectively 0.06, 0.01, and 0.00.
Capital Expenditure and Firm Value
To directly test the link between investment and firm value, we estimate firm fixed effects regression of firm's market value on capital expenditure using various subsamples. Table 7 shows the results.
Regressions (1) and (6) respectively report sub-sample results for ATP non-adopters and ATP adopters.
Regressions (2)- (5) and regressions (7)-(10) divide the sample further by the level of inside ownership.
For ATP non-adopters, capital expenditure is positively associated with firm's market value, but for ATP adopters, there is no connection between capital expenditure and firm's market value (see regressions (1) and (6)). When we limit the sample to those with inside ownership less than 10%, capital expenditure is negatively associated with firm's market value for ATP adopters. But, we do not find this for ATP non-adopters. These results support the overinvestment hypothesis of Jensen (1986). It is also consistent with the findings of Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009) that link the degree of entrenchment and the efficiency of capital expenditure. Using dual-class firms, they report that capital expenditures contribute significantly less to shareholder value at firms with a greater divergence between insider voting rights and cash flow rights.
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23 Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) , on the other hand, study the efficiency of acquisitions. They find that acquirers with more anti-takeover provisions experience significantly lower announcement period abnormal stock returns.
Profitability
If entrenched managers invest in value-destroying projects, firm profitability should drop during the postadoption period. This is what we find in Table 8 Panel A, where we use three different measures of firm profitability (NI/Assets, NI/Equity, and EBIT/Sales). Regardless of our measure of profitability, we find that within-firm adoption of anti-takeover provision leads to a within-firm drop in firm profitability.
The coefficients on ATP are all negative and statistically significant. The economic magnitudes are also large. Firms with ATP have respectively 8%p, 12%p, and 10%p lower NI/Assets, NI/Equity, and EBIT/Sales than those without it. In our regressions, we include lagged profitability to control for any auto-correlation in corporate performance, and to control for firm behavior adopting ATP after experiencing poor performance. Regressions are estimated over the 1999-2009 period using nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange. t-values are based on standard errors clustered by firm.
Cash Dividend Payouts
If entrenched managers use up corporate resources in value-destroying projects, the firm would run out of earnings that can be distributed out to shareholders as cash dividends. We test this in Table 8 Panel B.
When using firm fixed effects model, we do not find strong evidence on this. The coefficient on ATP is negative and marginally significant when we regress dividend/sales (see regression (1)). But, coefficients turn insignificant once we switch to other measures of dividend payout (see regressions (2) and (3)).
The results, however, become stronger when we move to industry fixed effects model. We find evidence that cash dividend payouts drop with the introduction of anti-takeover measures. takeover measure. Overall, we conclude that firms that adopt anti-takeover provisions experience lower dividend payout during the post-adoption period.
Delisting during the Global Financial Crisis
Lastly, we test how firms with ATP fared during the global financial crisis by investigating the delisted firms either in 2009 or 2010. If entrenched managers engaged in negative NPV projects and thereby lowered profitability, we can predict that they would fare worse than those without ATPs. Table 9 shows the Probit regression results where Delist (1 if firms delisted either in 2009 or 2010, and 0 otherwise) is the binary dependent variable. Column (1) includes 2-digit industry dummies, while column (2) includes 4-digit industry dummies. 25 Point estimates denote marginal effects on probability. As expected, the coefficient on ATP is positive and highly significant, indicating that firms with charter-based antitakeover provisions fared worse than those without it during the global financial crisis. The coefficient of 0.0311 (in column (2)) suggests that an adoption of ATP increases the probability of delisting by 3.11%p.
Given that the sample mean of delisting was 10% in 2009, this can be considered as a substantial increase in delisting probability. In Table 9 , we also find that firm size, leverage, cash holdings, and advertising expenditure, and operating profit also matter. As expected, firms with smaller size, higher leverage, smaller cash holdings, and lower profitability have higher chances of delisting. Table 3 shows that firms with certain characteristics are more likely to adopt anti-takeover provisions.
C. Two Endogeneity Problems
That is, firms that have low inside ownership, low foreign ownership, small firm size, or small cash holdings are more likely to adopt ATPs. This suggests that our ATP dummy is not truly exogenous and its coefficient can be biased by self-selection problem. Another possibility is the reverse causality problem.
That is, firm performance (or other dependent variables) influencing ATP adoption, and not vice versa.
The argument is that poorly performing firms may adopt ATPs for fear of hostile takeover and this leads to a negative relationship between the two (see Core, Guay, and Rusticus 2006, Lehn, Patro, and Zhao 2007) . In this subsection, we address these two endogeneity issues.
Subsamples by Propensity Score
One obvious solution to the self-selection problem is to control for firm characteristics that influence the ATP adoption decision, which we do in all of our analyses. One can go a step further and run the regressions using a subsample of firms that share similar characteristics. Table 10 shows the results. We first obtain the fitted probabilities from Table 3 Regression (2), where we estimate a Probit model that predicts the likelihood of ATP adoption. In other words, we obtained the propensity score of each firmyear observations. Second, we drop the bottom half observations in terms of propensity score and estimate again our two key regressions (Regression (6) in Tables 5 and 6 ). By dropping the bottom half, we are in effect using a control group (ATP non-adopters) that is much closer to the treatment group (ATP adopters) in terms of their ATP adoption likelihood.
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Our key results remain intact when using this subsample. The coefficients on the interaction terms are positive (negative) when regression for firm value (capital expenditure). As a robustness check, we also tried thresholds other than the 50 percentile value. We tried 75 and 90 percentile values. Higher thresholds mean that we are limiting our control group firms so that they are much closer to the firms in the treatment group, in terms of ATP adoption likelihood. The coefficients have the expected signs and, in most cases, they are statistically significant.
GMM System Estimation
One solution to the reverse causality problem is to control for lagged performance variables on the righthand side of our regression, which we do whenever Tobin's q or accounting profitability measures are regressed. We go a step further here and conduct GMM system estimation following Blundell and Bond (1990) , where lags of dependent variables, lags of their first differences, lags of endogenous variable (ATP), and first differences of exogenous variables are used as instruments.
27 Table 11 replicates our key regressions (Regressions (2) and (6) in Tables 5 and 6 ) by using GMM system estimation. Note that the lag of one year was sufficient to make the error term serially uncorrelated. 26 This approach, however, is different from a typical propensity score matching (PSM) method, where each individual observation in the treatment group is matched with an observation (or multiple observations) in the control group. We opt to take our ad hoc approach because the nature of our data did not meet the common support condition that is necessary to use the PSM method. In other words, our data does not ensure that firms with the same characteristics have a positive probability of being both ATP adopters and non-adopters. See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) for details on PSM method. 27 We do not estimate two-stage least squares (2SLS). This is because we could not identify a valid instrument that is exogenous, correlated with ATP, but not with firm performance variables. Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2010) also use GMM regression approach to address the endogeneity problem when studying entrenched manager's value-decreasing acquisitions.
Our principal results remain intact. That is, ATP destroys firm value and increases capital expenditure when inside ownership is low.
D. Alternative Hypothesis and Counter Evidence
Despite our robustness tests using propensity scores and GMM system estimation, one may still easily come up with an alternative story that can explain some of the results in this paper. Suppose there is a firm expecting lower profitability in the future, for a reason other than the adoption of ATP. Foreseeing lower firm value and a higher takeover possibility, this firm may adopt ATP. One can also imagine that such tendency would be greater for firms with low inside ownership. Ex post, the profitability of this firm falls, as expected. Consequently, the firm value and the dividend payouts also fall. With poor performance, this firm will also be hit harder by the global financial crisis and eventually get delisted in subsequent years.
This alternative story, however, is not consistent with two other pieces of evidence presented in this paper. First, it cannot explain why firms increase capital expenditure after the adoption of ATP. Firms with poor business prospects and low retained earnings should invest less. But, in this paper, we show that firms that are more likely to suffer from managerial entrenchment -firms with low inside ownership -increase capital expenditure after the adoption of ATP. Second, the alternative hypothesis cannot explain why inside ownership matters within the ATP-adopted firms. Inside ownership may influence the ATP-adoption decision, but it is hard to imagine why firms that have already adopted ATPs would suffer more if inside ownership level is low. Under the alternative story, given the assumption that inside ownership and ATPs are substitutes, the opposite is more likely. That is, firms with high inside ownership would adopt ATP only if their business prospect is extremely bad. On the contrary, firms with low inside ownership would adopt ATP even if their business prospect is only modestly bad. In this case, the extent of value-destruction during the post-ATP adoption period should be greater for firms with higher inside ownership.
Conclusion
Managerial entrenchment is a topic widely studied in the field of corporate finance. But, empirically quantifying the entrenchment effect has not been an easy task. The time-invariance of anti-takeover provisions, the shadow pill problem, and the endogeneity of their adoptions are the key challenges. In this paper, we try to address those challenges by making use of a unique situation in Korea. With the removal of statute-based anti-takeover provisions during the aftermath of the Asian crisis, a significant number of Korean firms started to introduce charter-based anti-takeover measures, such as supermajority requirement on director dismissals, golden parachutes, supermajority requirement on mergers, and so on.
This provides a setting where anti-takeover provisions vary over time, allowing us to investigate the relationship in a firm fixed effects framework. Also, given that all the provisions newly introduced are charter-based that require shareholders' approval, we are not subject to the shadow pill problem that often plagues U.S. studies. Moreover, their adoption at the shareholders' meeting is an unexpected news item that constitutes a valid event, allowing one to conduct meaningful event studies. Firm fixed effects regressions and event studies help us identify the causal effect by investigating whether the value of ATPadopting firms fall when it should (identification in time).
Using public firms in Korea over 1999-2009, we find a number of interesting results. First, we find that firms with lower inside ownership, lower foreign ownership, smaller firm size, or lower cash holdings are more likely to adopt charter-based anti-takeover measures. Second, our event studies and firm fixed effects regressions show that firms with anti-takeover provisions experience lower firm value during the post-adoption period. We also find that the extent of such share price drop is greater for firms with low inside ownership, suggesting that the level of inside ownership and charter-based anti-takeover measures are substitutes. Third, consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis of Jensen (1986), we find that firms with anti-takeover measures experience higher capital expenditures, lower profitability, and lower dividend payouts. Fourth, by investigating delisted firms either in 2009 or 2010, we find that firms with anti-takeover provisions fared poorly during the global financial crisis, compared to those without such provisions. Lastly, we confirm that our principal results remain intact even when we control for selfselection and reverse causality problems.
Our result also sheds light on the current policy debate in Korea over the adoption of poison pill.
Based on the findings in our paper, we expect that the introduction of poison pill will also have an entrenchment effect. Given that poison pill is seen as a stronger defense tool than the ones we study in this paper, we also conjecture that it would have a stronger entrenchment effect. Industry fixed effects Probit regression of ATP (1 if anti-takeover provision exits, 0 otherwise) on ownership variables, operating profit, firm size, and other control variables. Point estimates denote marginal effects on probability. Regressions are estimated over the 1999-2009 period using a sample of nonfinancial firms. Regressions (1) and (2) respectively include 2-digit and 4-digit industry fixed effects. All regressions use year dummies. t-values, in the parenthesis, are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface. This table shows cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) before and after the adoption of anti-takeover charter provisions. In the first four columns ( (1)- (4)), we report CAARs and their corresponding t-stats when using the full sample of firms (203 firms on day 0). In the next four columns ( (5)- (8)), we report the results when limiting to firms with inside ownership less than 10 percent (29 firms on day 0). In the last four columns ( (9)- (12)), we report the results when limiting to firms with market capitalization above 50 billion won (approximately 50 million won, 52 firms on day 0). In columns (1), (2), (5), (6), (9), and (10), we cumulate AARs from day -10. In all other columns, we cumulate AARs from day 0. The event day is the day of shareholders' meeting. Abnormal returns are estimated from market model using past 250 trading days from day -260 to -11. The sample period is from 2001 to 2009. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel B. Fixed Effects, Pooled OLS, and Probit Regressions of Dividends
Firm fixed effects ((1) through (3)), industry fixed effects ((4) through (6)), and random effects Probit (7) (1)- (3)) and capital expenditure ((4)-(6)) on ATP and control variables. Regressions (1) and (4) drop the bottom half observations in terms of propensity score obtained from Table 3 Regression (2). Regressions (2) and (5) drop observations below the 75 th percentile values and regressions (3) and (6) drop those below the 90 th percentile values. All regressions are estimated over the 1999-2009 period using nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange. All regressions use year dummies. t-values, in the parenthesis, are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface.
(1) (3) and (4) regress capital expenditure. Regressions (1) and (3) restrict the sample to those with inside ownership greater than 30%, while regressions (2) and (4) restrict to those with less than 10%. All regressions are estimated for over the 1999-2009 period using nonfinancial firms listed on the Korea Exchange. All regressions use year dummies. zvalues, in the parenthesis, are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface.
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